An important decision for a firm is how to allocate its advertising budget among different types of advertising. Most traditional channels of advertising serve the purpose of building consumer awareness and desire about the firm's brand, or a product within a category. Such forms of advertising primarily include advertising on television, in print, using billboards, etc., and, in the digital era, display advertising. With recent developments in technology, sponsored search (or paid search) advertising at search engines in response to a keyword searched by a user has become an important part of most firms' advertising efforts. An advantage of sponsored search advertising is that, since the firm advertises in response to a consumer-initiated search, it is a highly targeted form of communication and the salesconversion rate is typically higher than in traditional advertising. However, a consumer would search for a brand, a category or a product only if she is already aware of the same due to previous traditional advertising efforts. Moreover, competing firms in an industry can free-ride on the awareness-building efforts of other firms and "steal" their customers by directly advertising in response to category keywords or even on the keywords of the firms investing in awareness-building advertising. Anecdotal evidence shows that this is indeed the case. In other words, traditional advertising builds awareness, while sponsored search is a form of information technology-enabled communication that influences consumers after awareness has been created, and this aspect can be misused by competitors.
Introduction
Online advertising is the fastest growing channel of advertising, likely to exceed 25% of the total US advertising expense, by 2015. 1 This rapid growth in online advertising is impressive given that the market share of television advertising, at about 35%, is only slightly higher.
Firms spend the largest portion of their online advertising budget on sponsored search advertising, which captures nearly half of the share. 2 The advantages of sponsored search such as better targetability and reach are well known. Advertisers can target users of a specific age group, location, . . . , when they search for certain keywords on a search engine. Another important advantage of sponsored search is its accessibility. A firm with an advertising budget of as little as $5 can advertise on sponsored search. Setting up a campaign can be done in less than five minutes from a personal computer without having to contact any marketing agency. And most importantly, the advertiser pays only when a user visits its website. Hence the effectiveness and value is far more tractable. Such unique advantages have contributed to the rapid growth of sponsored search advertising.
Not surprisingly, sponsored search has received a lot of attention from researchers and practitioners. While firms are dedicating progressively larger fractions of their advertising budget to sponsored search advertising at the expense of traditional advertising, the strategic implications of the interactions between them have not been carefully researched.
A widely employed marketing framework is the awareness-interest-desire-action (AIDA) model that sequentially captures the various stages of a typical consumer's decision process before finally purchasing a product. Traditional channels of advertising, such as television, newspapers, radio and billboards are directed more towards the initial stages of the AIDA model. They are initiated by the firm and are highly effective in creating awareness and getting customers interested in a firm's brand or the product category. (Display advertising, which is a form of online advertising and is more recent, also serves the purpose of generating awareness about a product among consumers. We include it under traditional 1 http://www.onlinemarketing-trends.com/2011/06/18-us-media-ad-spending-to-go-digital.html 2 http://searchengineland.com/emarketer-among-online-ads-search-to-gain- most-new-dollars-in-2011-80707 advertising.) However, sponsored search is located more towards the last stages of the model and influences the purchase action. Sponsored search effectively targets the customers who are already aware of the product and have shown some interest or desire in the product by searching for an associated keyword at a search engine. Thus, the two forms of advertising-traditional awareness-generating advertising and sponsored search advertising-are inter-related, complementary and critical for successfully consummating the sale of a product.
In a strategic market with competing firms, creating awareness has benefits and perils especially when the awareness created through traditional advertising for one brand can be exploited by sponsored search advertising by a competing firm. Competitors, instead of allocating their advertising budget to create awareness about their own products, can advertise on the keywords of a firm in the same industry that is creating awareness by investing in traditional advertising, trying to steal the latter's potential customers. We refer to this as "poaching" in sponsored search. In fact, since the competitors are not spending to create awareness, they can bid more aggressively on sponsored search keywords (which are typically sold through position auctions run by the search engine) and thus can even enjoy an advantage over the firm that has attracted the customers in the first place.
We provide anecdotal examples where such poaching is evident. Figure 1 shows the effect of super-bowl advertising on the search volume of the firms' keywords. Shoe company "Skechers" advertised its "Shape Ups" model during Super-Bowl 2011. Also, the social coupon firm "Groupon" and online flower selling firm "Teleflora" had their own advertisements during super-bowl 2011. It can be easily seen that the advertising has created considerable awareness resulting in heavy keyword search on the internet. Such traffic reaches a peak the day after the super-bowl. While these firms spent millions of dollars for their super-bowl commercials, we see that their competitors, at the same time, are poaching on their keywords as depicted in Figure 2 . "Reebok" is poaching on the keyword "Shape Ups," while "LivingSocial" is poaching on the keyword "Groupon." Other online flower selling companies are poaching on the keyword "Teleflora." These are only a Figure 2: Poaching few of many poaching examples that happen with increasing frequency on the internet. In summary, poaching is when a firm creates awareness resulting in pertinent keyword search on the internet, and competing firms aggressively bid on these keywords and display their products.
Poaching in sponsored search has two important aspects. First, the poaching firm is free riding on the awareness that is created by its competitor through traditional advertising. This is often accomplished through advertising on the competitor's specific keyword or on a more general "category keyword." Second, the poaching firm is stealing potential customers from its competitor. When a customer sees iPad's television commercial and searches for the keyword "iPad" with the ultimate goal of purchasing it, he is a potential customer for Apple. Samsung's "GalaxyTab" ad on the search results page for iPad is an extremely effective targeting strategy where Samsung tries to convince potential customers of Apple to buy Samsung's Galaxy Tab. Thus, Samsung has a strong incentive to bid on the keyword iPad, effectively freeriding on the awareness created by Apple for iPad. Of course, if Samsung invests in awareness-generating advertising leading to corresponding keyword searches for the Galaxy Tab, Apple can also advertise on Samsung's keywords. In other words, competing firms can practice mutual poaching.
Such poaching behavior has implications not only for the competing firms' strategies on the sponsored search and traditional advertising channels, they also strategically affect the search engine's auction strategy. In this paper, we examine these issues in an analytical framework. In particular, we are trying to answer the following questions. Under what conditions is poaching beneficial for the firms? What are the effects of poaching on the firms' decisions for budget allocation among traditional and sponsored search advertising?
What are the consequences of poaching for the search engine and what should be the search engine's best response? How can poaching in sponsored search affect other channels of advertising?
First, we consider the case when firms are identical. We find the existence of an asymmetric equilibrium in which one firm mostly advertises on traditional channels and creates awareness, while its competitor poaches on its keyword in sponsored search. The incentive for poaching increases as the search engine increases the reserve price in the sponsored search auction primarily because the not-poaching option, in which the firms stick to their own keywords and pay almost the reserve price, become less attractive. Interestingly, we show that although the competition in sponsored search increases with poaching, the search engine's revenue may decrease in the presence of poaching. This is because sponsored search auctions become very competitive which increases the advertising prices of the keywords.
This makes sponsored search a less desired option for the firms and they have the incentive to move a larger share of their money to traditional advertising. As a result, the search engine may benefit from discouraging competition in its own keyword auctions by making poaching harder for the firms. This explains the practice of employing "keyword relevance"
measures, under which all major search engines under-weight the bids of firms bidding on competitors' keywords.
We extend our analysis to the case of asymmetric firms, i.e., firms with different advertising budgets. When the difference between budgets is large enough, the firm with the smaller advertising budget has a greater incentive to poach as compared to the firm with the larger budget (because the latter conducts more traditional advertising and drives more traffic towards its keywords). Interestingly, with asymmetric firms, the search engine may in fact benefit from poaching-its revenue is maximized when the poaching is controlled but not prohibited. By employing appropriate keyword relevance factors, the search engine continues to under-weight the bid of the poaching firm only to the extent that it still prefers to poach. At this point, it can capture the full advertising budget of the smaller firm. While the larger firm moves a larger fraction of its advertising budget to traditional awareness-generating advertising, this effect is small (as compared to the case of symmetric firms). Using keyword relevance scores, the search engine is therefore capturing the budget of the smaller firm, while at the same time effectively protecting the larger firm by charging the poaching firm higher prices. Hence, keyword relevance measures could be interpreted as a complex price discrimination mechanism: for the weak firm, poaching is a very desirable option; for this reason, the search engine can charge the weak firm a higher price than the strong firm which is creating the search volume. This result explains why search engines are in support of allowing bidding on trademarked keywords by competitors, 3 yet still employ keyword relevance measures to handicap poaching firms. We also present several extensions of our model in which we consider other types of asymmetry and analyze the effects of other phenomena like the presence of "category keywords." Different aspects of sponsored search have been recently studied by several papers including Ghose and Yang (2009) , Katona and Sarvary (2010) , Jerath et al. (2011 ), Liu et al. (2010 and Zhu and Wilbur (2011) . Our work is different from these papers, firstly, because we model sponsored search in a multi-channel setting, and secondly, we focus on the consequences of poaching for the search engine, the traditional channels and the competing firms. Kim and Balachander (2010) model sponsored search in a multi-channel setting, however, they do not consider poaching behavior of the firms. Desai et al. (2011) consider the branding effects of poaching in sponsored search by looking at vertically and horizontally differentiated firms and without taking the other channels of advertising into account.
However, in our model, the firms are not vertically or horizontally differentiated and the poaching behavior is due to the existence of awareness arising from other channels of advertising. Joo et al. (2011) empirically show that television advertising increases Internet search volume. We use their finding as a building block in our model. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model.
In Section 3, we analyze the basic model with symmetric firms and discuss the firms' strategies as well as the equilibria of the game. In Section 4 we analyze the basic model with asymmetric firms. In Section 5, we consider several extensions of the basic model and show that the key insights are unchanged under each extension, while we obtain additional interesting results. In Section 6, we analyze "keyword relevance measure" as a strategic device used by a search engine to control poaching, and show how it affects the search engine's revenue. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude with a discussion and lay out some possible directions for future research.
Model
We consider a duopoly setting in which each firm has an advertising budget and a specific keyword. For instance, if Apple sells the iPad and Samsung sells the Galaxy Tab, then the keywords associated with Apple and Samsung are "iPad" and "Galaxy Tab," respectively. 4
The advertising budget can be spent on sponsored search or on other channels of advertising.
We bundle all other channels together and call them traditional advertising. As discussed earlier, we focus on awareness-creating aspect of traditional advertising. When a firm spends on traditional advertising, more customers become aware of its product. These customers either buy the product directly or search for the product at a search engine. The transaction of those who search the product is either influenced by the sponsored links or not. We assume that the purchase decision of a non-zero fraction of the customers is driven by sponsored links on the search results page. Also, we assume that the volume of search for each keyword is an increasing function of the amount of budget that the corresponding firm spends on traditional advertising.
A firm can also spend its advertising budget on sponsored search by advertising on its own keyword or on the competitor's keyword. To simplify, we assume that there is only one advertising slot available for each keyword. Therefore, the Generalized Second Price auction, used by major search engines, reduces to a regular second price auction with reserve price. (This simplification does not impact the insights from the model.) The order of events of the game is the following. We assume that the search engine first decides and announces the reserve price for its auctions and the keyword relevance factor. Then, both firms simultaneously decide how they want to allocate their advertising budget to traditional advertising and to sponsored search advertising.
There is a clear trade-off between traditional advertising and sponsored search. On the one hand, the firm can decide to create awareness through traditional advertising. On the other hand, the firm may choose to advertise on the competitor's keyword and rely on the awareness created by the competitor. Using a game theory model, we analyze this trade-off.
We start with a simple model where there are two symmetric firms and two keywords; later, we extend our model in a number of ways. Our model consists of three entities, the users, the firms, and the search engine. We assume that there are two firms that produce identical products. Since the advertising budget and the product price are exogenous and fixed in our model, we assume that the firms want to maximize their sales.
Firms
There are two firms 1 and 2. Each firm has a total budget B allocated for total advertising. 2. Defending: The firm expects to be poached by its competitor, therefore, it optimizes its budget allocation accordingly. This is the best response to poaching.
3. Neutral: The firm optimizes its budget allocation assuming that its competitor does not poach.
A firm's strategy can also be a mixed strategy meaning that each of the above strategies will be played with certain probabilities. (Theorem A3 in the appendix shows that in a repeated game environment, where the firms can constantly adjust their budgeting decisions, a mixed strategy captures partial budget allocations in which a firm spends part of its budget on each of the above strategies.) Finally, as discussed earlier, we assume that each firm wants to maximize the number of units it sells.
Users When firm i spends T i on traditional advertising, it generates awareness among (1 + α)T i customers. Out of these, αT i customers buy the product independent of what they see in sponsored search. (They may purchase directly without searching, or search but ignore sponsored links.) 5 It is not important to our model whether the customers purchased directly or searched but ignored the sponsored search results. Therefore, without loss of generality, we assume that all the customers who search the product are influenced by sponsored search results. Without loss of generality, through scaling, we assume that T i customers purchase the product that they see in sponsored search section of the keyword of firm i. 6
Search Engine
When a customer searches for a keyword, the search engine uses a second price auction with reserve price R to sell the advertising slot on that keyword. We know that T i customers search keyword i. For each of them, the firms simultaneously decide how much to bid.
Using subgame perfect equilibrium, we show in Theorem A1 in the appendix that the unique outcome of this sequential second price auction coincides with the outcome of a market-clearing-price mechanism. 7 Therefore, we get the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Assuming that firm 1 spends S 1 and firm 2 spends S 2 on keyword i, if
customers purchase from firm 1, and
customers purchase from firm 2.
However, if S 1 + S 2 < T i R then S 1 /R customers purchase from firm 1 and S 2 /R customers purchase from firm 2.
The search engine's revenue is the total amount of money that the two firms spend in sponsored search.
5 Note that we are implicitly assuming that advertising response function is linear; however, our results apply to other response functions proposed in the literature like concave and S-shaped functions as well. Details of this analysis are available upon request.
6 The scaling basically means that the fraction of transactions that were not influenced by sponsored search to those who were influenced is α.
7 This result is interesting in itself and, to the best of our knowledge, is new to the auctions literature.
Sequence of Moves
Order of moves is as follows.
1. The search engine decides and announces reserve price R. 8
2. The two firms simultaneously decide their budget allocation strategies.
3. Consumers see traditional advertisements. Some consumers buy directly and some search on the search engine.
4. The search engine sells the advertisement slot in the search results page of each consumer in a second price auction with reserve price R. The firms simultaneously submit their bids for each consumer who searches the product on the search engine.
5. Each consumer purchases from the firm that is shown in the sponsored search results returned to him.
Analysis with Symmetric Firms
We start by assuming that the firms are symmetric. We analyze each of the strategies that the firms might use. We derive the firm's optimal budget allocation, their revenues, and the search engine's revenue in each of the cases. Finally, we use the derived expressions to calculate the Nash equilibria of the game.
Strategies
Neutral Strategy: We start by analyzing Neutral Strategy. In this case, the firm assumes that the other firm does not poach. The firm's revenue, according to Lemma 1, is αT + (B − T )/R if B − T < T R, and is αT + T otherwise, where T is the spending on traditional channel. Therefore, assuming that T N is the optimal value of T (N stands for Neutral strategy), we get the following lemma.
Lemma 2 If R > 1/α, firm's Neutral strategy is to spend all of its money on traditional advertising, i.e.,
Otherwise,
Intuitively, Lemma 2 indicates that if the reserve price in sponsored search is above some threshold it is better for the firm to only advertise on traditional channel; otherwise, the firm allocates just enough budget to sponsored search that its link is shown to all the customers who search the product. Furthermore, notice that the condition R > 1/α compares the reserve price R, set by the search engine, and the effectiveness of the traditional channels, captured by α. If the search engine sets its reserve price above 1/α, its revenue will be zero.
Therefore, it is safe to assume that the reserve price is always set to less than or equal to 1/α. It is also immediate from Lemma 2 that the less effective (or the more saturated) the traditional channel is, the higher the search engine can set the reserve price.
Defending Strategy: In the Defending strategy, the firm allocates its budget across the channels assuming that its competitor poaches. In other words, the Defending strategy is the best response to the Poaching strategy. Hence, the firm's revenue is αT +(B −T )/R if 2B − T < T R, and is αT + T
where T is the spending on traditional channel. Letting T D (D standing for Defending) be the optimal value of T , we get the following Lemma. Like in Lemma 2, if R > 1/α then T D = B meaning that if the reserve price of the search engine is too large, the firm spends all its budget on traditional channel.
Lemma 3 In Defending strategy, assuming R < 1/α, the optimal spending on traditional channel is
otherwise.
Poaching means that the competitor is also bidding on the firm's keyword. As a result, the per-customer price of sponsored search is determined by two factors: the reserve price set by the search engine, and the bid of the competitor. The first case in Lemma 3 corresponds to the case where the reserve price is so low that it does not affect the firm's decision. In this case, the firm is choosing a balance between spending on traditional channel to obtain direct conversions and moderate the competition and spending on sponsored search to fight the competitor. The second case in Lemma 3 describes the situation where the reserve price is high. Since the price in sponsored search is already high, the firm does not want to pay even higher price that will be reached due to competition. Therefore, the firm's best strategy is to increases its budget in the traditional channel to moderate the competition and decrease the price of sponsored search. But the price of sponsored search can only decrease to the reserve price. In this case, the firm loses some of its potential customers to its competitor, but does not pay higher than the reserve price R for those that it wins.
Finally, notice that, in either case, the firm spends more on traditional advertising under the Defending strategy than under the Neutral strategy; this makes Poaching even more beneficial for the competitor.
Poaching Strategy: In the Poaching strategy, the firm spends all of its money on its competitor's keyword. The firm is not creating customer awareness or interest; therefore, we have T A = 0.
Revenue Analysis
We use P i,j , where i, j ∈ {N, D, A}, to denote revenue of a firm that is using strategy i while his competitor is using strategy j. For example, P A,N denotes the revenue of a poaching firm whose competitor is playing the Neutral strategy.
Neutral Strategy: According to Lemma 2, the revenue of a firm who is using the Neutral strategy, as long as its competitor does not poach, is
However, if the competitor poaches, using Lemma 1, its revenue will be
Consequently, the search engine's revenue from a firm that is playing the Neutral strategy is B − T N .
Defending Strategy:
Similarly, according to Lemma 3, the firm's revenue if the other firm does not poach is
However, if the other firm poaches, the revenue is
Similarly, the search engine's revenue from a firm that is playing the Defending strategy is
Poaching Strategy: Consider a firm whose strategy is Poaching. If the competitor also poaches simultaneously, no money is spent on traditional advertising and hence no customer is gained. Therefore, the revenue of both firms will be zero,
However, if the competitor plays the Neutral strategy, the revenue of the poaching firm would be
Finally, if the competitor plays the Defending strategy, the revenue of the poaching firm is
.
Notice that the only way that a firm can benefit from poaching is when the competitor plays Defending. In other words, P A,N < P N,N . Later, we will see that this is not always the case for asymmetric firms. Furthermore, note that poaching can be beneficial only if
This gives us the following condition
which basically means that Poaching happens only if R is large enough.
Finally, the search engine's revenue from a poaching firm is always B unless the other firm is also poaching in which case the search engine's revenue is 0.
Equilibrium Analysis
As we discussed earlier, each firm can pick one of the three strategies for allocating the advertising budget. This leads to the two-person normal form game depicted in Table 1 . Table 2 summarizes the search engine's revenue in each of the outcomes. The search engine's revenue and the firms' revenues are depicted in Figure 3 . First, note that the revenue of the search engine increases in R until R = 1/α where the revenue drops to zero. Therefore, the search engine wants to set its reserve price to just below 1/α to maximize its revenue. (This also conforms with the intuition that the optimal reserve 
The search engine's revenue, and the firms' revenues are depicted in Figure 4 . We can see that the weak firm starts poaching at lower values of R than the strong firm (and also lower values of R than in the case of symmetric firms). In other words, for low values of R no firm poaches, for medium values of R only the weak firm may poach, and for high values of R both firms may poach. Moreover, the weak firm's incentive for poaching is larger than that of the strong firm (and also larger than in the case of symmetric firms). This is intuitively because the strong firm has a relatively large search volume; therefore, the poaching of the weak firm does not affect the sponsored search price significantly (and, therefore, does not affect the strong firm's strategy significantly) as compared to the case of symmetric firms.
Unlike the case of symmetric firms, poaching may be beneficial for the search engine for medium values of R (roughly, for 0.6 ≤ R ≤ 1 in Figure 4) . If the firms are more asymmetric (i.e., B is larger), we see that even for high values of R, poaching still increases the search engine's revenue. This is intuitively because the weak firm can only steal a small fraction of the strong firm's customers. As a result, the strong firm's response to the weak firm's poaching is not as noticeable as in the case of symmetric firms. Therefore, the strong firm does not shift a lot of its budget from the sponsored search to the traditional channel in response to poaching. On the other hand, the weak firm spends all of its money on sponsored search. Hence, the search engine's revenue may increase in the presence of poaching. The following proposition states this result.
Proposition 2 Poaching can increase the search engine's revenue when the advertising budget of one firm is large enough as compared to the advertising budget of the other firm.
We had shown that in the case of symmetric firms that the search engine's revenue may decrease when poaching happens. Therefore, the search engine may benefit from discouraging poaching. On the other hand, for asymmetric firms, particularly when the budget of one firm is much larger than the budget of the other firm, poaching can increase the search engine's revenue. Therefore, the search engine should not prohibit poaching in this case, but possibly only handicap poaching efforts by the weak firm (to prevent too strong a budget shift to traditional advertising channels by the large firm). By using "keyword relevance maesures," search engines have already implemented a mechanism that penalizes poaching behavior to the extent desired by them. In Section 6, we discuss how this mechanism works and how it can improve search engine's revenue.
Extensions to the Basic Model

Category Keyword
In this extension, we assume that there is a category keyword which attracts customers from the traditional advertising of both firms. For example, in the context of tablets, "iPad" and "Galaxy Tab" are keywords specific to the companies Apple and Samsung, respectively, while "tablet" is a category keyword that describes both products. Some customers who see traditional awareness-generating advertisements of iPad or Galaxy Tab may search the keyword "tablet" instead of searching the product name.
We assume that some fraction of the customers who are exposed to traditional advertising of each firm search the category keyword instead of the firm specific keyword. We show that the insights obtained in Section 3 also hold under this extension. The detailed analysis is included in the appendix.
Exogenous Keyword Search Volume
In the analysis of Section 3, we assumed that a firm needs to advertise on the traditional channel to have non-zero search volume. In this section, we drop that simplification and assume that the firms may have "exogenous search volume" even without recently-conducted awareness-generating advertising, say due to previous reputation. If a firm has exogenous search volume V , we assume that V customers search its product even if it does not advertise on traditional channel. We also let the firms to be asymmetric in this aspect by assuming that the exogenous search volume of the strong firm is V while the exogenous search volume of the weak firm is 0.
The detailed analysis of this extension is included in the appendix and confirms the insights of Section 3. We find that, as in Section 4, for low values of R no firm poaches;
for medium values of R only the weak firm may poach and for high values of R both firms may poach. Furthermore, if V is large enough (one firm has much larger exogenous search volume than the other), only the weak firm wants to poach, and its incentive to poach increases with V . The following proposition describes an interesting consequence of the above dynamics.
Proposition 3
The firm that has larger exogenous customer awareness spends even more on awareness-generating advertising in order to defend itself from the poaching of its competitor.
Display Advertising by Search Engine (Banner Advertising)
Internet display advertising is primarily an awareness-creating channel of advertising. Therefore, even though it is an advertising channel that has only recently become popular, we bundle Internet display advertising in the traditional channel in our model. However, unlike other traditional channels, Internet display advertising is largely controlled by the search engines. Search engines usually match the website publishers (websites that attract Internet users) to the advertisers and collect a share for this service. Examples of such services are "DoubleClick Ad Exchange" by Google, "AdECN" by Microsoft and "Right Media" by Yahoo!. In other words, a firm may move its money away from sponsored search advertising but spend some of it on display advertising with the same search engine. In this case, the search engine still obtains the revenue, which might have different implications for its auction design strategy. We extend our model to let a fraction of the money spent on traditional channel be given to the search engine to model the search engine's share from display advertising. We show, in the appendix, that this extension produces the same insights as in Section 3.
Keyword Relevance Measures
All the major search engines transform an advertiser's submitted bid into an effective bid before determining the outcome of the sponsored search auction. A multiplier is typically used to compute the effective bid, and this multiplier depends on many parameters including the advertiser's past performance (click-through-rate), the quality and reputation of the advertiser's product or website, and the relevance of the keyword being bid on to the advertiser. We explain this last parameter with the example below.
Suppose that the two firms Apple and Samsung are interested in the keyword "iPad". Of course, Apple is much more relevant to this keyword than Samsung, since Apple produces the iPad while Samsung only sells a competing product in the same category (tablets).
Therefore, if the relevance of Apple to the keyword "iPad" is 1 on a continuous scale from 0 and 1, the relevance of Samsung to this keyword is less than 1 and is, say, 0.5. Suppose that Apple's bid is $1 and Samsung's bid is $1.5. Assume that both firms have a click-throughrate 0.1 which means that the probability that a customer who sees their sponsored link clicks on the link is 0.1. Also, assume that both firms have high quality products and websites with same reputation. It appears that the search engine should prefer to display Samsung instead of Apple in this case (assuming only one is shown) as Samsung should generate more revenue than Apple for it. However, surprisingly, in a situation like this, the search engine decides to show Apple because of higher "relevance to the keyword". In fact, Samsung has to bid and pay at least $1 0.5 = $2 to win this keyword. If Samsung bids $1.5, Apple wins the keyword and has to pay only $0.75.
One explanation for the existence of "relevance measures" is that the search wants to improve user experience by showing only relevant advertisements to the users. Although this might be one reason, we argue that it is probably not the only reason. If the sponsored link of Samsung has a click-through-rate as high as Apple itself on the keyword, this indicates that the users like Samsung's advertisement just as much as Apple's. Furthermore, when clicking, they already know they are clicking on Samsung's advertisement.
We provide an alternative explanation for the existence of keyword relevance measures-search engines may use keyword relevance measures to handicap poaching to the extent they want. In this section, we show that by employing the appropriate relevance factors, the search engine can maximize its revenue. To simplify and only focus on the effect of relevance measures, we assume that both firms have the same click-through-rate, and the same quality and website reputation.
We assume that if one firm wants to bid on the keyword of the other firm, its bid (the bid of the poacher ) will be multiplied by 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. If γ = 1, we are in the framework that we have been so far: firms poach on each others' keywords without any handicap. On the other extreme, if γ = 0, firms can not bid on each others' keyword. This is similar to situation where bidding on trademarked keywords is not allowed. We want to see the effect of γ on the search engine's revenue. Since we want to allow for asymmetric firms, we stay with the setting where one firm has budget B ≥ 1 while the other firm has budget 1.
Strategies:
The Neutral and the Poaching strategies remain essentially the same. However, the Defending strategy changes slightly because the Defending firm now knows that the bid of the Poaching firm is not as effective as it was when γ was 1. As a result, we have
, and
otherwise. Similarly,
1+α , and
Equilibrium Analysis: The equilibrium analysis remains similar to the previous cases;
Figure 5: Revenue of the search engine as a function of the reserve price for different levels of relevance enforcement factor γ. The budget B = 6, α = 0.5 and γ is set to three levels 1, 0.9 and 0.4.
hence, we omit here. Figure 5 shows the search engine's revenue when B = 6, i.e., the advertising budget of one firm is six times the advertising budget of the other firm. As we can see, when γ = 1, for small values of R poaching is the only equilibrium; as R increases, non-poaching and mixed equilibria appear. However, as we decrease γ to 0.9, non-poaching becomes the only equilibrium for high values of R. This is because decreasing γ handicaps poaching, and this handicap is more severe when R is large. Moreover, we see that for middle values of R, where both poaching and non-poaching equilibria exist, the revenue of the poaching equilibrium becomes slightly more than the revenue of the non-poaching equilibrium. This difference becomes even more clear as we decrease γ further down to 0.4. Intuitively, though penalized, poaching still happens, defending the strong firm. Therefore, the strong firm does not shift Figure 6: Revenue of the Search Engine as a function of the relevance enforcement factor γ. The reserve price is set to 1.5, close to the optimal reserve price, α = 0.5 and B is set to three levels 1, 10 and 50.
a large portion of its money to traditional channel to moderate the competition. However, at the same time, the search engine extracts all the budget of the weak firm. In other words, for any fixed R, if the firms are asymmetric enough (the budget of one firm is large enough than the other one), the search engine benefits from penalizing (or handicapping)
poaching. But the penalty should only be up to the level where the weak firm still prefers to poach. In doing so, the strong firm will be protected and its response to poaching will be moderated. Interestingly, keyword relevance measures could be interpreted as a complex price discrimination mechanism: for the weak firm, poaching is a very desirable option; for this reason, the search engine can charge the weak firm a higher price than the strong firm which is creating the search volume. Figure 6 shows the search engine's revenue as a function of the relevance multiplier γ for different levels of asymmetry. Wherever there are multiple equilibria, we take their average to calculate the search engine's revenue. 9 When the firms are not very different (their budget is close), the search engine's revenue is maximized at any small enough γ. Any small enough γ sets a high enough penalty for poaching so that poaching does not happen.
9 The results are robust to weighted average as well However, as the asymmetry increases, because of the above discussion, the search engine benefits from a medium level of penalizing. This can be clearly observed in Figure 6 (c),
where the peak at γ = 0.9 shows the best value of γ for the search engine. We summarize the above discussion in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 If the advertising budget of the stronger firm is large enough compared to that of the weaker firm, the search engine handicaps poaching by competitors but does not prohibit it.
The above proposition offers an explanation for why search engines are in support of allowing advertising by competitors on trademarked keywords (such as brand and company names), yet still employ keyword relevance measures to handicap poaching firms. Note also that in the above situation the weaker firm practices poaching and benefits from it while the strong firm (with larger advertising budget) is hurt from poaching. The search engine also benefits from poaching by the weak firm. These results from the model support the observation that some leading firms in their respective industries (e.g., Rosetta Stone and Louis Vuitton) sued search engines in an effort to prevent them from following a policy of allowing bidding on trademarks by competitors, and the search engine opposed this. 10
Conclusions and Discussion
We studied the poaching behavior of firms in sponsored search. A firm can spend on traditional channels of advertising like television, newspapers, ... to create awareness, attract the customers, and increase the search volume of its keyword at a search engine. Alternatively, a firm may limit its awareness-creating activities and spend its budget on stealing the potential customers of its competitor by advertising on the competitor's keyword in sponsored search, which we call poaching.
We found that even when the firms are identical, they may follow different advertising strategies-one firm focuses on traditional channel and spends most of its budget for creating awareness while the other firm spends most of its budget on poaching. Although poaching seems to be beneficial for the search engine as it increases the competition on the keywords, we find that it actually may decrease the search engine's revenue. Since poaching makes sponsored search a less efficient channel of advertising, the firms may spend less on it.
Therefore, the search engine may increase its revenue by making poaching harder for the firms.
When the firms are asymmetric, and the advertising budget of one firm is significantly larger than the advertising budget of the other firm, there is an interesting twist in the above results. First, the stronger firm does not want to poach while the weaker firm has much more incentive to poach (as compared to the symmetric case). Furthermore, unlike the case of symmetric firms, poaching may increase the search engine's revenue. Since the stronger firm has a large search volume, the effect of the weaker firm's poaching on his keyword is small. Therefore, poaching of the weaker firm does not make sponsored search much less efficient for the stronger firm. Thus, the stronger firm keeps almost the same portion of his budget in sponsored search. On the other hand, the weaker firm does not need to create awareness and can spend its entire budget in sponsored search, which increases the search engine's revenue.
We find that in asymmetric case, the best strategy for the search engine is to handicap poaching but not too much so that the weak firm still prefers to poach. This handicap can be implemented through charging the poaching firm a higher price than the non-poaching firm for the same keyword. Interestingly, we see that well-known search engines, e.g., Google, Yahoo! and Bing, have already implemented such penalties through "keyword relevance" measures. A firm has to pay higher price than its competitor for appearing on the competitor's keyword, even if it has the same click-through-rate and quality measures as its competitor. By including the keyword relevance measures in our model, we confirmed that a medium level of penalty maximizes the search engine revenue. This explains the fact that the search engines are fighting to allow the firms to bid on their competitors' trademarked keywords, but at the same time are penalizing poaching through charging higher prices.
We also consider various extensions of the model which confirm the robustness of our results and also provide additional insights. Specifically, we consider an extension in which one firm has exogenous search volume for its keyword (say, because of previous reputation).
We find that, surprisingly, the firm that has higher exogenous search volume has greater incentive to invest in traditional advertising to drive even more search volume to its keyword.
Our work sheds light on the poaching behavior of the firms in a multi-channel advertising setting. There are many other directions that could, and need to, be studied in future work.
In particular, we assume that the product prices and the advertising budgets are exogenous in order to focus on splitting the budget across the channels. It would be interesting to know the optimal advertising and pricing policies of the firms in the presence of sponsored search as a unique and growing channel of advertising. Furthermore, the firms are not vertically or horizontally differentiated in our model. Perhaps, a joint model of our work and Desai et al. (2011) , that allows differentiation in a multi-channel advertising model, would be an interesting direction for future work.
which case her sponsored search ad will not be shown to the customers. In the next few subsections, we show that the analysis done in previous section will not be much affected in the presence of category keyword.
Strategies
Neutral Strategy: First, assume that there is only one firm in the market. If the firm spends x in traditional advertising, to win the customers of the product keyword she has to spend at least xR in sponsored search of the product keyword, and βxR in sponsored search of the category keyword, where R is the reserve price of sponsored search set by the search engine. The optimal amount of money to be spent on traditional advertising in this case is
Consequently, since in Neutral strategy, the firm does not advertise on the keyword of the other firm (i.e., S N 2 = 0), the amount of money that he spends on sponsored search is:
Since the the number of queries to the product keyword and the category keyword are proportional to 1 and β, by Theorem A2, we have S N 1 β = C N ,
Poaching Strategy: As said before, the poacher relies on stealing customers from its competitor. The poacher's spending on its own keyword and on traditional advertising is 0:
Using Theorem A2, the poacher's spending on the competitor's keyword is
and on the category keyword is
Defending Strategy: In the Defense strategy, the firm assumes that the other firm poaches; given this assumption, the firm's revenue is αT +(B −T )/R if 2B −T < T (1+β)R, and is αT + T (1 + β)
B−T 2B−T otherwise. Assuming α < (1 + β)/R, the optimal solution to this problem is
and
Revenue Analysis
We analyze the revenue of the firms case by case:
Both Firms Neutral: If both firms choose Neutral strategy, the revenue of each firm is
Both Firms Defending: If both firms choose Defending strategy, the revenue of each firm is
Both Firms Poaching: The revenue of both firms in this case is of course 0.
One Firm Poaching, One Firm Neutral: In this case, the number of queries on the product keyword is T N and on the category keyword is βT N . Therefore, the Neutral firm's revenue is
Similarly, the Poaching firm's revenue is
One Firm Defending, One Firm Neutral: In this case, the number of queries on the Defending firm's product is T D and on the Neutral firm's product is T N . Also, the number of queries on the category keyword is β(T N + T D ). Hence, the Neutral firm's revenue is
Similarly, the Defending firm's revenue is
One Firm Poaching, One Firm Defending: In this case, the price will be more than or equal to R for category keyword and the product keyword; therefore,
A2 Banner Ads
So far, we have assumed that the only source of revenue for the search engine is sponsored search; this assumption is not completely true in reality as many search engines rely on "Banner Ads" as a source of income. Banner Ads basically create awareness and are more similar to the traditionalchannels of advertising; however, their main difference is that they are usually controlled by search engines, e.g. Yahoo! and Google.
We assume that δ fraction of the money that a firm spends on traditional advertising is given to the search engine for banner ads. Note that not all the money that the firms spend on banner ads is given to the search engine; most of it is collected by the publishers, e.g New York Times, who agree to show the banner ad on their website. Although the fraction δ might be different for different publishers, we assume for simplicity that it is the same.
A3 Intrinsic Search Volume
Suppose that firm i has some initial search volume V i , which is independent of how much firm spends on creating awareness. For simplicity, assume that V 1 = V and V 2 = 0, i.e., one firm (the weak firm) has zero initial volume while the other one (the strong firm) has V . As before, we assume that spending x on awareness advertising creates search volume x; hence, if the strong firm spends x on awareness advertising, the search volume for its keyword will be V + x.
Strategies
Neutral Strategy: For the weak firm, the Neutral strategy has not changed and is as before
However, for the strong firm, if B ≤ V R, we have
Defending Strategy: For the weak firm, the Defending strategy has not changed, however, notice that when the strong firm poaches, Defending is not necessarily the best response from the weak firm as he may want to poach too. If
otherwise,
For the strong firm, remember that in Defending strategy the firm assumes that the other firm poaches; given this assumption, the firm's revenue is αT + (B − T )/R if 2B − T < (T + V )R, and is αT +(T +V ) 
Revenue Analysis
Neutral Strategy: For the weak firm, as long as he is not poaching, the effect of V is unobservable. Therefore, 
A4 Proofs of Theorems Used As Intermediate Results
Theorem A1 Suppose that n identical items are sold in a sequential second price auction with reserved price R. Two bidders 1 and 2 with budgets B 1 and B 2 are participating in the auctions; each bidder wants to maximize the number of items that she wins. The outcome of any subgame perfect equilibrium of the game is equivalent to the outcome of market clearing price mechanism with reserve price R.
Proof: First suppose B 1 /R + B 2 /R ≥ n, i.e., the market clearing price is at least R. Let p be the market clearing price; i.e., B 1 /p + B 2 /p = n. Note that if the first player bids p in all rounds, he can make sure that he wins at least n − B 2 /p = B 1 /p items because his opponent has to pay p for every item that he wins. Similarly, if the second player bids p in all rounds, he can make sure that he wins at least n − B 1 /p = B 2 /p items. Since, B 1 /p + B 2 /p = n, we see that player i cannot win more than B i /p items, which means that he wins exactly B i /p items. Now, consider the case where B 1 /R + B 2 /R < n. In this case, we know that if the largest bid in the auction is smaller than R, the item in that round will be left unallocated.
Also, if the larger bid is at least R, but the smaller bid is less than R, the item will be allocated, but at price R (instead of the second highest bid). Given this information, bidding anything below R, in any round, is weakly dominated. Also, by bidding R, bidder i can make sure that he wins at least B i /R items. Since bidder i can never win more than B i /R items, in any subgame perfect equilibrium, he wins exactly B i /R items. 2 Lemma A1 The function x C+x is monotonically increasing and concave in x, for any x ≥ 0 and fixed C ≥ 0.
Proof: The first derivative in x is C (C+x) 2 and the second derivative is − 2C (C+x) 3 . 2 Theorem A2 Suppose that there are two investment options. The revenue of the first one has the functional form αQ x αC+x if x is invested, while the revenue of the second one is βQ x βC+x . Then, the optimal way to split x between the two options is to invest αx α+β in the first one and βx α+β in the second one.
Proof: The proof directly follows from Lemma A1 and first-order conditions. 2 Theorem A3 Consider the single stage game G = (N, A), where N = {1, 2} is the set of players and A = a 1 , . . . , a n is the set of actions available to each player. Assume that each action a i = (x i,1 , . . . , x i,m ), where m j=1 x i,j = B, corresponds to a budget allocation decision across the options 1, . . . , m. Also, let H = (N, A, δ) be an infinitely repeated game G with discount factor δ < 1. If P 1 = (p 1,1 , p 1,2 , . . . , p 1,n ) and P 2 = (p 2,1 , p 2,2 , . . . , p 2,n ) is a Nash equilibrium of G, then playing P 1 and P 2 in every stage is a Nash equilibrium of H.
Moreover, the average expenditure of player j on option i converges to n k=1 p j,k x k,i almost surely as the number of stages increases in H.
